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WORKERS' COMPENSATION
Alston Johnson*
DISABILITY: ADOPTION OF "ODD LOT" DOCTRINE
After this symposium was first written, the supreme court handed
down three opinions in which the so-called "odd lot" doctrine was
adopted for use in Louisiana.1 This doctrine has been discussed prev-
iously in this forum2 and elsewhere,3 and no extended treatment will
be made at this juncture.
The opinion in Oster v. Wetzel Printing, Inc.,4 one of these three
decisions, summarizes the characterization of an "odd lot" worker
and its role in the disability determination as follows:
In determining whether an employee is permanently and
totally disabled, it is not a prerequisite that he be absolutely
helpless. If the evidence of his physical impairment and of other
such factors as his mental capacity, education, and training indi-
cates that he can perform no services other than those which
are so limited in quality, dependability or quantity that a reason-
ably stable market for them does not exist, the injured employee
is entitled to total disability compensation unless the employer
or his insurer is able to show that some form of suitable work is
regularly and continuously available to the employee within rea-
sonable proximity of his residence.'
Due to her injury, age, and lack of education, the court held that the
claimant in Oster was an "odd lot" worker and that the employer
had not shown the existence of stable employment for her in the
local labor market. In Turner,' the same principles were adopted,
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1.Oster v. Wetzel Printing, Inc., __ So. 2d __ (La. 1980); Turner v. American
Mut. Ins. Co., - So. 2d __ (La. 1980); Dusang v. Henry C. Beck Builders, Inc., 389
So. 2d 367 (La. 1980). The author of the opinions in Oster and Turner was Mr. Justice
Dennis; the author of the opinion in Dusang was Mr. Chief Justice Dixon. See also the
concurring opinion of Judge Stoker in Rushing v. Ins. Co. of North America, __ So.
2d at __ (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980) (Stoker, J., concurring), suggesting such an adoption.
2. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1977-1978
Term- Workmen's Compensation, 39 LA. L. REV. 881, 883-893 (1979).
3. W. MALONE AND A. JOHNSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE §
272 in 13 LA. CIVIL LAW TREATISE (2d ed. 1980).
4. __ So. 2d __ (La. 1980).
5. __ So. 2d at __
6. - So. 2d __ (La. 1980).
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but the matter was remanded for further evidence on the availabil-
ity of alternative employment.
In Dusang, the claimant was an ironworker and welder who suf-
fered injuries to his wrist and shoulder in a fall on the job. After
treatment, he returned to work but continued to complain of pain.
The evidence of pain was uncontradicted, though its severity was
somewhat less than that complained of by other workers in "sub-
stantial pain" cases. Nonetheless, the trial court awarded Dusang
benefits based upon total and permanent disability, no doubt on the
basis of "substantial pain."7 The appellate court narrowly amended
the judgment to one based upon partial disability.8
The supreme court analyzed the evidence on pain and held that
Dusang was suffering substantial pain, though it characterized the
testimony of pain as "not so strong" as that in a recent total disabil-
ity case which it had decided.' But the court then held that even a
worker suffering substantial pain is not necessarily totally and per-
manently disabled, unless he can show himself to be in the "odd lot"
category of workers, as defined.
Adoption of the "odd lot" doctrine in these three cases is signifi-
cant and will undoubtedly aid all judges in grappling with the new
disability standard. It is particularly important that one of the deci-
7. There are numerous appellate decisions dealing with substantial pain since the
enactment of the new disability standards in 1975. In most of them, the claimant was
awarded benefits on the basis of total and permanent disability, even though in some
instances it was shown that he had returned to gainful employment. See Richard v.
Standard Fittings, 379 So. 2d 33 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979); Lemoine v. Employers Cas.
Co., 378 So. 2d 594 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979); Guidry v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Const.
Corp., 376 So. 2d 352 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979) (partial disability); Jones v. Arnold, 371
So. 2d 1258 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979); Simmons v. State, 368 So. 2d 770 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1979); Bonnette v. Travelers Ins. Co., 367 So. 2d 1261 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979); Wright v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 357 So. 2d 1213 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 So. 2d 1180
(La. 1979); Rachal v. Highlands Ins. Co., 355 So. 2d 1355 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied,
358 So. 2d 645 (La. 1978); Phillips v. Dresser Eng'r Co., 351 So. 2d 304 (La. App. 3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 353 So. 2d 1048 (La. 1978). In many of these, the employer offered
no evidence of other jobs available to a non-working claimant.
8. Dusang v. Henry C. Beck Builders, Inc., 379 So. 2d 775 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980)
(five-judge panel, with one judge concurring with separate reasons and two judges
dissenting).
9. 389 So. 2d at 371. The court noted that elements of the "odd lot" doctrine
had played a role in previous supreme court decisions, even its most recent "substan-
tial pain" case. Whitaker v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc., 387 So. 2d 1093 (La. 1980);
Lewis v. St. Charles Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist., 337 So. 2d 1137 (La. 1976); Futrell v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 276 So. 2d 271 (La. 1973). In Whitaker, it was signifi-
cant that the claimant was a person of very limited education who probably never
could have been trained for the type of job which his physical post-injury condition
would permit him to hold.
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sions is a "substantial pain" case, since this indicates that the fact
that the worker labors in pain (though a very persuasive factor)
should not entirely determine the question of disability. Use of a
"substantial pain" criterion as the only factor in a disability deter-
mination eventually would have destroyed any chance of uniformity,
since pain is so subjective and difficult to measure or analyze. For
one to consider the overall picture of the worker in the context of
the labor market is a much better idea: given his residual disability
and given his level of pain (if any), can we realistically expect that
he will be able to hold regular employment? The "odd lot" doctrine,
working in tandem with the new partial disability provisions, will
give lawyers and judges the flexibility and expert testimony to
decide that question as it ought to be decided.
MULTIPLE EMPLOYERS
Problems posed by multiple employment continue to plague
Louisiana appellate courts. Multiple employment may take any
number of forms, but some recognizable categories may be singled
out for discussion. An employee might be employed regularly by one
employer but temporarily "borrowed" by another for a different
task. Such a transfer of employment should not really be termed
"multiple" employment, since the employee actually has only one
employer at any point in time. Such an employee, however, is per-
mitted to seek compensation against either his regular employer or
his "borrowing" employer."0 Under the circumstances, it is not sur-
prising that the "borrowed employee" situation is discussed as if it
were one of multiple employment. However, there were no signifi-
cant decisions during this term involving borrowed employees.
A worker may also labor a part of the day at one job, and then
"moonlight" at a separate job. Again, this should not actually be
called multiple employment but rather successive employment. In
common parlance, it may be said that the worker is holding two jobs
at once. In legal terms, however, he has a separate contract of em-
ployment with each employer, devoting different portions of his day
to each one. The compensation statutes make no specific reference
to that situation, and the Louisiana courts have consistently fixed
the rights of the employee to basic compensation benefits in accord-
ance with the contract of employment under which he was working
at the time of injury." For those purposes, any separate contract of
employment would be irrelevant, and no contribution between the
10. W. MALONE AND A. JOHNSON, supra note 3, at § 58.
11. W. MALONE AND A. JOHNSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE §
325 in 14 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 95 (2d ed. 1980).
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employers would be appropriate. Such a result does not mean, of
course, that the worker employed twenty hours a week at each of
two jobs is only entitled to a wage determination based upon a
twenty-hour work week. The definition of "wages" in the Act re-
quires calculation of compensation benefits to be based upon a mini-
mum of forty hours of employment per week.12
The decision during this term in Lott v. Louisiana Power &
Light Company,"3 a situation of successive employment, affirms this
result. The decedent was employed as a "contract pumper" by Em-
ployer A for a monthly sum equivalent to $96.25 per week. He also
was employed in the same capacity by Employer B (an entirely se-
parate concern, for work at a separate location) for a monthly sum
equivalent to more than $500.00 per week. He was killed while in
the course of his employment for Employer A. The insurer of Em-
ployer A paid compensation benefits based upon the weekly wage
payment to the decedent by Employer A. The decedent's spouse and
children sought an increase to the applicable maximum, claiming
that benefits should be based upon the combined weekly earnings of
the decedent from both jobs. The insurer of Employer A interposed
a plea of prematurity 4 on the ground that it was paying maximum
allowable benefits under the Act, since only the wage earned with
Employer A should be considered. The trial court sustained the ex-
ception, and the court of appeal affirmed. The appellate court cor-
rectly observed that the decedent was not "jointly" employed at the
job in which he was injured. Accordingly, the proper benefits were
to be fixed according to the wage paid by the employer in whose
service he was injured.
Had the decedent in Lott been jointly employed to perform a
single task, the burden of compensation would be shared by his joint
employers. 5 This situation was presented in Fontenot v. Town of
12. LA. R.S. 23:1021(7) (1950 & Supp. 1968): "'Wages' means average weekly wage
at the time of the accident. The average weekly wage shall be determined as follows:
(a) If the employee is paid on an hourly basis, his hourly wage rate multiplied by the
average actual hours worked in the four full weeks preceding the date of the injury or
forty hours, whichever is greater ...." The inclusion of this definition in the Act by
virtue of Act 25 of 1968 codified the jurisprudential position that a person working
fewer than forty hours a week at an hourly rate was entitled to benefits as if he had
been working forty hours a week. It also expressed the legislative intention that over-
time, if any, should be included in calculation of benefits. Whether that overtime had
to be in the employ of the same employer was not made clear, an ambiguity that led to
some of the problems discussed in this symposium.
13. 377 So. 2d 1277 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
14. See LA. R.S. 23:1314 (1950).
15. LA. R.S. 23:1031 (1950): "In case any employee for whose injury or death
payments are due, is at the time of the injury, employed and paid jointly by two or
[Vol. 41
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Kinder.6 The claimant worked at a trash dump owned by the town
of Kinder. The town had an agreement with Allen Parish that the
dump also would receive trash collected outside the town by parish
employees. The agreement called for the parish to provide certain
heavy equipment for use at the dump and to share the salaries of in-
dividuals who worked there. The claimant worked part-time at the
dump (forty-eight hours a week, but only two weeks a month). The
town paid him for one forty-eight-hour work period at $2.10 per
hour; the parish paid him for the other forty-eight-hour work period
at $2.00 per hour. He was injured while burning trash at the dump.7
The court concluded that the claimant was jointly employed by
the town and the parish. Under the circumstances, the Act required
that the compensation benefits to which he was entitled be shared
by the employers according to their "several wage liabilities." 8
The process of decision in these cases, entirely proper in each in-
stance, revealed some unresolved problems in other parts of the
Act. The plaintiff in Lott, in the effort to convince the court to look
to all sources of the worker's income to calculate benefits, cited the
recent decision of Jones v. Orleans Parish School Board.9 The claim-
ant in Jones was a school teacher who suffered injuries while at-
tempting to break up a fight between two students. The evidence
revealed that at the time of his injury, he not only was working as a
teacher; he also was a car salesman. After the injury, he returned to
selling cars.
The parties agreed that the plaintiff was only partially disabled
under the Act, since he was able to return to gainful employment in
some capacity. Such a person is entitled to two-thirds of the dif-
ference between "the wages" he was earning at the time of injury
and "any lesser wages" which he "actually earns" in any week
thereafter. 0 The appellate court found the record inadequate on the
more employers subject to the provisions of this Chapter, such employers shall con-
tribute to such payments in proportion to their several wage liabilities to the employee
16. 377 So. 2d 554 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 379 So. 2d 1102 (La. 1980).
17. The opinion does not state whether the injury occurred during a week in
which he received a check from the town or one in which he received a check from the
parish. In any event, this ought to be irrelevant. The employee could have received in
each week that he worked 50% of what was owed him by one employer, and 50% of
what was owed him by the other. The evidence seems clear that he was jointly
employed by the two employers to perform the same task for each.
18. LA. R.S. 23:1031 (1950).
19. 370 So. 2d 677 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
20. LA. R.S. 23:1221 (1950 & Supp. 1968):
Compensation shall be paid under this Chapter in accordance with the following
schedule of payments: .... (3) For injury producing partial disability ... sixty-six
1981]
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question of weekly wages and remanded the case for the purpose of
taking additional evidence on the point. However, the court stated
that determination of the difference in pre-injury earnings and post-
injury earnings must be made by comparing all pre-injury earnings
(teaching salary plus earnings from selling cars) to all post-injury
earnings." The court in Lott rejected the analogy drawn by the
plaintiff from the Jones decision, and in fact indicated its disap-
proval of the Jones rationale even in the context of partial disability.
The court's pronouncement in Jones deserves additional com-
ment. Prior to 1975, the problem would have been rare, because par-
tial disability cases themselves were so rare. The statute called for
benefits based upon difference in wages in the case of partial
disability; but total disability was so easy to establish that very few
decisions of partial disability were rendered." The post-1975 statute
should, in theory, produce more partial disability awards, since a
worker able to return to some steady, gainful employment should be
considered partially disabled.
Thus the question will become quite important: when we con-
sider what the partially disabled worker used to make and what he
now makes, should we consider all sources of income? The Jones
court was of the opinion that a simple measurement of the "school
teaching salary against present earnings as a car salesman . . .
would unjustly penalize the plaintiff for moonlighting to pay his
and two-thirds per centum of the difference between the wages the employee was
earning at the time of the injury and any lesser wages which the injured
employee actually earns in any week thereafter in any gainful occupation for
wages ....
The definition of "wages" given in R.S. 23:1021(7) states only that "wages" means the
hourly wage rate "multiplied by the average actual hours worked in the four full
weeks preceding" the injury. Thus, one could argue, as Jones did, that the average ac-
tual hours worked at all employment would be a part of "wages."
21. The court specifically excluded from any consideration upon remand the
amount of Jones' "pension" (presumably retirement benefits being received from the
school board), as part of post-injury wages or earnings. In theory, this is not an amount
which he "actually earns" in a given week after the injury. If it represents to some ex-
tent deferred earnings, he "actually earns" these sums prior to his injury and retire-
ment. However, the question is not without considerable importance. If the Act is not
a wage-protection plan, but merely a minimum protection of loss of earning capacity,
should it attempt to replace earning capacity lost because of old age rather than work-
related disability? Even though R.S. 23:1221(2) (1950 & Supp. 1968) requires that total
disability benefits, for example, extend for the period of disability, is it wise to con-
tinue them to the age of eighty-five when other benefits are now available to replace
lost earning capacity (i.e., Social Security payments, retirement benefits, etc.), and
when earning capacity might in any event have been diminished or lost due to retire-
ment, regardless of injury?
22. W. MALONE AND A. JOHNSON, supra note 3, at § 275 n.65.
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family expenses."23 At first glance, it does appear that such a
measurement would not give Jones benefits based upon the dif-
ference between his former "wages" and his present "wages."
However, upon closer examination, the alleged unfairness is less
apparent. The Act is not a wage-insurance plan. Rather, it is a
legislative scheme intended to insure a basic minimum subsistence
to persons now wholly or partially disabled from earning due to
work-related injuries. This is apparent when one considers the
plight of two injured workers now wholly disabled. Even if one earned
$300 per week prior to his injury and the other $1,000 per week,
they receive precisely the same benefit check: the statutory max-
imum.2 ' The higher-paid worker may argue that this is unfair, and he
would be right if the legislative objective were a wage-replacement
plan. But the legislative intent is to guarantee basic subsistence
levels thought to be reasonable and economically feasible, not to
replace wages at pre-injury levels. If the higher-paid worker wants a
wage-replacement plan, he will have to purchase it in the private
sector.
This basic premise suggests the answer to the court's dilemma
in Jones. The employer in whose service the injury occurred (the
school board) may properly be asked under the Act to pay benefits
based upon a forty-hour work week. This will be the case, as we have
seen, whether the employee worked two hours a week, or twenty
hours a week, or actually worked forty hours each week. The defini-
tion of wages under the Act requires that minimum response. 5 And
if that employer requires or permits the employee to work more
than forty hours a week, then the benefits may properly be based
upon the actual number of hours worked. But such overtime will be
a matter wholly within the control of the employer. If the employer
only wishes the employee to work forty hours a week and con-
comitantly only desires the compensation exposure which that en-
tails, then the employer can refuse any overtime employment. If the
employer makes the business judgment that overtime is required or
desirable and thus knowingly exposes himself to the additional com-
pensation benefits," then he may properly be asked to pay benefits
based upon hours beyond the normal forty-hour week.
23. Jones v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 370 So. 2d 677, 680 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1979).
24. Two-thirds of the average weekly wage of each worker would exceed the
statutory maximum payable under the Act for injuries occurring between September
1, 1980 and September 1, 1981. Therefore, each is limited to the maximum. See LA.
R.S. 23:1202 (Supp. 1975).
25. See LA. R.S. 23:1021(7) (1950 & Supp. 1968). See note 12, supra.
26. The premiums which may be charged the employer are calculated on the basis
of the wage rate of each employee and the number of overtime hours (if any) that each
1981]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
But if the employer is made to respond at the rate of sixty
hours a week because the employee works forty hours a week for
the employer and twenty hours a week for someone else, then the
employer is being asked to compensate the employee for work hours
over which he has virtually no control. He is in essence being asked
to provide the employee with wage-protection insurance beyond the
requirements of the Act.
In the specific factual situation present in Jones, the claimant
should be entitled to the difference between the "wages" which he
earned in the employ of the defendant employer (the school board)
and the "wages" he actually earns in any given week thereafter.
The Act guarantees that this will be a minimum of a forty-hour
work week and any additional hours of overtime that Jones worked
for the school board during the four weeks preceding injury. To the
extent that Jones' employment with the school board has caused
him to lose a portion of the basic earning capacity of forty hours (or
actual hours worked with the permission of the school board in its
employ), the Act grants him a remedy. But to the extent that Jones
now "actually earns" the same wages that he previously earned
with the school board (and therefore presumably has the same basic
earning capacity"7 which he had prior to his injury), the Act cannot
assist him. To take account of all of his pre-injury earnings in the
partial disability calculation would be to convert the Act into a
wage-protection insurance policy.
DOMESTIC EMPLOYEES
Louisiana is among the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions
which do not extend compensation benefits to domestic employees
and other workers not employed in a trade, business, or occupation.
In fact, only one state appears to cover such workers under its com-
pensation act. 8 In 1972, the National Commission on State
works. An employer who regularly pays overtime hours to his employees can expect
that his compensation premiums will ultimately reflect this additional exposure.
27. "Earning capacity" and wages "actually earned" are not necessarily identical.
Many compensation statutes use earnings as a measure of earning capacity because
this normally is a simple and convenient method of calculation. But in times in which
jobs are scarce and persons are working only a few hours a week, earnings would not
be a good measure of capacity. And in some instances, feelings of loyalty or sympathy
may lead an employer to pay wages which reflect a greater earning capacity than the
employee actually has.
28. New Hampshire. See Table 2, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, (1972). Louisiana has never excluded "casual"
workers as some jurisdictions do. But it has always excluded domestic employees by
virtue of the requirement that a claimant be employed in the trade, business, or oc-
cupation of his employer. LA. R.S. 23:1035 (1950 & Supp. 1975 & 1979).
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Workmen's Compensation Laws included in its nineteen recommen-
dations the suggestion that states cover "household workers and all
casual workers ... at least to the extent they are covered by Social
Security."29 Many of the recommendations have been implemented
by the great majority of jurisdictions, but this recommendation has
not met with any significant approval.
The result in Morgan v. Equitable General Insurance Company,3"
decided during this past term, appears to indicate a change in Loui-
siana's position. But appearances can be deceiving. The claimant was
employed as a domestic employee by the defendant's insured. Her
duties included ordinary household chores as well as incidental care
for an elderly blind person who lived in a small guest house on the
insured's property. Her responsibilities in the latter regard encom-
passed cleaning the guest house, doing laundry for the resident, and
delivering meals which she cooked in the insured's home.
The claimant injured her ankle during one such food delivery to
the guest house. Though she returned to work after medical treat-
ment, she found that she could not continue her employment. There
seemed to be little dispute that she was rendered totally disabled by
the incident.
The insured paid the claimant a weekly wage of $76.50 at the
time of injury, approximately two-thirds of which came from the in-
sured's funds and the remainder from funds available to the resident
of the guest house. The claimant also was entitled to one meal a day
and transportation to and from work.
The trial court held that the claimant was entitled to compensa-
tion benefits, and the appellate court amended the amount of
benefits slightly but affirmed.3" The opinion does not reflect serious
objection by the defendant on the question of basic coverage for
domestic employees under the Act. And it must be conceded that
the holding of both courts is that the claimant, even though a
domestic employee, was entitled to compensation.
29. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAWS 41 (1972).
30. 383 So. 2d 1067 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
31. The trial court had concluded that the claimant was a hourly-wage employee
at a rate of $2.20 per hour, and multiplied that rate by forty hours under the authority
of R.S. 23:1021(7) to obtain an average weekly wage. The insured's wife had testified
that she attempted to pay a weekly sum which, when combined with meals and
transportation provided, would equal the then minimum wage of $2.20 per hour. The
appellate court reasoned that the claimant was paid a weekly wage, and that no
calculation under R.S. 23:1021(7) (1950 & Supp. 1968) was required for such a person.
Thus it awarded benefits based upon the monetary weekly wage plus the value of the
meals and transportation. This had the ultimate effect of reducing the claimant's weekly
benefit from the then statutory maximum of $85.00 to $69.00.
19811
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Nevertheless, the case is an unusual one and should not be
regarded as authority for expansion of the Act to domestic
employees. Though the opinion does not reflect it, the insured owned
some rental property. He employed a handyman to maintain the prop-
erty, and purchased compensation insurance from the defendant to
cover the handyman's employment. The claimant's salary also was
listed as a part of the payroll for premium and audit purposes,
though she worked at the rental property only on a very sporadic
basis. The existence of the policy and the listing of the claimant's
salary led the plaintiff to argue that R.S. 23:1166 would not permit
the insurer to deny compensation coverage:
When an insurance company issues a policy of insurance to
an employer covering claims for injuries to employees that may
arise within the scope of the employer's business, the insurance
company shall be estopped to deny liability on the grounds that
the employment was not hazardous and during the period such
insurance is in effect, claims for injuries occurring during such
period by such employees against the employer or the insurance
company shall be exclusively under the workmen's compensation
act.
The same insurance policy contained liability coverage for tort
claims. After the defendant had argued in the trial court that no
compensation coverage was available for the claimant, and had urged
that same argument in brief in the court of appeal, the claimant filed
a separate tort suit against the defendant. Subsequently, the defen-
dant abandoned by written motion its appeal on the issue of
coverage under the Act, limiting its appeal to the question of
amount of benefits. No doubt the defendant thought that compensa-
tion liability would be less expensive than the threatened tort liability
in the pending lower court litigation. Since there was an abandon-
ment of the assignment of error on the coverage issue, the appellate
court affirmed the trial cour.t's holding on that point without discus-
sion. The parties subsequently agreed on a discounted lump sum
payment of the compensation due, and the tort suit was dismissed.
Under the peculiar circumstances, the result may have been
just. But neither the cited portion of the Act nor a recent amend-
ment should be taken as extending coverage to domestic employees.
Such an important extension should be legislative in nature and
clear in intendment. The cited portion of the Act was passed at a
time when coverage extended only to hazardous businesses. If an in-
surer had collected premiums from an employer on the basis that
the business was hazardous and was covered, it was estopped from
denying that character of the business in litigation. But the section
[Vol. 41
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applies to "claims for injuries to employees that may arise within
the scope of the employer's business." To read the section as argued
by the plaintiff in Morgan would deprive the employer or his insurer
of the defense that the specific injury in a given case is not
traceable to the employer's business. This is a legitimate argument,
and the purchase of an insurance policy should not prevent such an
argument. The claimant in Morgan was not engaged in the business
of her employer at the time of her injury. She was performing a
purely domestic chore, and it does not appear that she had only tem-
porarily been delegated to that task and diverted from regular
employment in an ongoing business.2
A recent amendment to the Act, however, also might be read to
extend coverage to domestic employees. R.S. 23:1035, a remnant
from the pre-1975 Act, is the basic coverage provision, stating that
the compensation statutes "shall also apply to every person perform-
ing services arising out of and incidental to his employment in the
course of his employer's trade, business or occupation . . . ,,1a Act
465 of 1979 added to that section the provision that the statutes
32. This was the case, for example, in Whitney v. United States Fidelity & Guar.
Ins. Co., 373 So. 2d 728 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 376 So. 2d 320 (La. 1979)
(Summers, Marcus and Blanche, JJ., dissenting), also decided during this past term.
The claimant was employed part-time by a furniture company to do carpentry and
security work. The president of the company instructed the claimant to accompany
him on a hunting trip in order to make necessary repairs to a camphouse on property
leased to the president and others. Plaintiff was injured on the trip, not while doing
the repairs but while accompanying the president and others on a quail-hunting ven-
ture. Plaintiff testified that he was accompanying the president on the quail-hunting
venture to become familiar with the property so that he might later entertain any
other guests in the president's absence. He was held entitled to compensation on the
ground that the injury was incidental to his employment and at the direct instructions
of his employer. See W. MALONE AND A. JOHNSON, supra note 3, at § 16.
33. Prior to its amendment in 1979, the section in its entirety read:
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to every person performing ser-
vices arising out of and incidental to his employment in the course of his
employer's trade, business, or occupation, except that the bona fide president,
vice-president, secretary, and treasurer of a corporation who owns not less than
ten percent of the stock therein, or a partner with respect to a partnership
employing him may by written agreement elect not to be covered by the provi-
sions of this Chapter. Such an election shall be binding upon the employing cor-
poration or partnerships and the widow, relatives, personal representative, heirs,
or dependents of the officer or partner so electing. No salary or compensation
received by any such bona fide corporate officer or partner so electing or a sole
proprietor shall be used in computing the premium rate for workmen's compensa-
tion insurance.
LA. R.S. 23:1035 (as it appeared prior to 1979 La. Acts, No. 465). See Duncan v. Bren-
nan, 386 So. 2d 1055 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980) (properly holding that domestic employees
are not covered under the Act).
1981]
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shall apply to every person performing services arising out of and
incidental to his employment in the course of "his own trade,
business or occupation ...." The argument could be advanced that a
domestic employee is conducting his own "business" of domestic ser-
vices, and any injuries in "his own" business should be compensable.
Though the wording of the amendment is susceptible of such an in-
terpretation, this was almost certainly not the legislative intention.
The title to House Bill 984, which became Act 465, stated that
its object was "to provide that a person in the course of his own
trade, business, or occupation or a sole proprietor may elect not to
be covered by workmen's compensation . . . ,,14 Any salary paid to a
person so electing would not be included in the calculation of
premiums for compensation coverage for such a business. This is a
legislative permission for such a person to bear his own accident
costs rather than to have them borne by his own business. The only
logical conclusion is that such a person is already covered under the
Act because he is "employed" by a separate legal entity, but now
wishes for financial reasons to opt out of coverage. A domestic
employee cannot cogently argue that he or she is "employed" in his
or her own trade or business, since a contract of employment re-
quires the agreement of two natural or legal persons. The amend-
ment could have been better drafted, making it clear that its only
intent was to permit otherwise covered persons to exclude coverage
and not to extend coverage to persons not presently covered under
the Act.
Nothing in this discussion is intended as a statement on the
wisdom of excluding domestic employees from compensation
coverage. This is a serious problem affecting a segment of society
least able to bear its own accident costs. But the solution should be
direct legislative response, not indirect or jurisprudential resolution.
ACCIDENT: IDIOPATHIC FALLS
The decision in Guidry v. Serigny"5 appears to commit the
Supreme Court of Louisiana to the view that an idiopathic fall
squarely within the course of employment also'arises out of employ-
ment and therefore is compensable. The plaintiff was employed as a
cook in the defendant's restaurant. On the way to the kitchen from a
34. 1979 La. Acts, No. 465 (Secretary of State's Official Publication). This intent
seems even clearer at several other points in the Act, at which the reference to per-
sons who may opt out of coverage is to "sole proprietorships" or to "sole proprietors."
No additional reference is made in those portions to a person employed in "his own"
trade.
35. 378 So. 2d 938 (La. 1979).
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storage area, she fell and suffered a back injury. The cause of her
fall was never conclusively determined. It might have been due to
the slipperiness of a newly waxed floor, or to a heart attack, or even
to a fainting spell. Both the trial court and the appellate court found
that the fall was not a result of wax on the floor, but a result of
some physical problem of the plaintiff not brought on or in any way
connected with her employment. Accordingly, compensation was
denied.3"
The supreme court reversed, reasoning that the fall itself was
the accident suffered by the claimant and that the precise cause of
the fall was immaterial. 7 Since the accident occurred squarely
within the course of the claimant's employment, she was entitled to
the benefits of the liberal arising-out-of test developed following
Kern v. Southport Mill.8 She was actively engaged in her
employer's business, and the necessities of that business required
that she be at the place of her injury. Accordingly, the court held
that her injury arose out of her employment as well.
Intermediate appellate decisons in Louisiana have been am-
biguous over the years on the basis for granting compensation in
such cases. Most cases used an "increased risk" test. If a worker suf-
fered an injury initiated by some idiopathic physical problem, he
would be entitled to compensation if he could show that the physical
environment in which he worked contributed to the ultimate injury
in some way. Such cases are cited by the court in Guidry: burns suf-
fered when an epileptic seizure caused a night watchman to fall into
a fire; 9 injuries suffered when a worker being transported tried
some chewing tobacco (to which he was unaccustomed), became dizzy,
and fell from the truck;"0 and death in an automobile collision follow-
ing the diabetic coma of a traveling salesman susceptible to such
problems." In each situation, it could cogently be argued that the
36. Guidry v. Serigny, 370 So. 2d 904 (La. Appp. 1st Cir. 1979).
37. The court remanded the case for the taking of additional evidence on the ex-
tent of the claimant's disability.
38. 174 La. 432, 141 So. 19 (1932). The court in Kern reasoned that whether an ac-
cident arises out of employment must be determined by time, place, and circumstance.
It concluded that an accident arises out of employment if the employee was engaged
about his employer's business at the time of injury and the necessities of the
employer's business required that he be at the place of the accident at the time of its
occurrence. This has subsequently been referred to as the time-place rule of Kern,
though it might just as well have been called a positional-risk approach. See W.
MALONE AND A. JOHNSON, supra note 3, at §§ 191-92, 382-92.
39. Ryland v. R. & P. Const. Co., 19 So. 2d 349 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1944).
40. Flowers v. Williams-Rieves Lumber Co., 5 La. App. 49 (2d Cir. 1926).
41. Hull v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 236 So. 2d 847 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied,
256 La. 862, 239 So. 2d 361 (1970).
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environment in which the worker found himself "caused" the actual
injury, or at least aggravated it.
The same argument could have been advanced in the Guidry
case. It might have been contended that the "cause" of the plaintiff's
injury was that the employer's floor was so hard that a back injury
occurred, or perhaps that the plaintiff struck some cooking equip-
ment on her way down. But the supreme court did not base its deci-
sion on that ground. It simply held that although a fainting spell or
attack idiopathic to the plaintiff may have caused her to fall, it was
the fall itself that caused her injury, without reference to her en-
vironment.
The result in Guidry is unremarkable, and probably could just
as easily have been reached on an "increased risk" argument. But
the absence of such language in the opinion suggests that the court
may have adopted a "positional risk" concept in such cases consis-
tent with its approach in other areas of compensation law. If the
employee is squarely within the course of his employment, one may
except to find that virtually any risk will be regarded as compen-
sable." This probably has been the case ever since the wandering
tornado happened upon the plaintiff's decedent squarely in the
course of his employment in Harvey v. Caddo De Soto Cotton Oil
Co. 3 in 1941. The court's adoption of such an approach in idiopathic
fall cases minimizes the danger that an employee subject to such
problems would be denied compensation on the pretext that the "ac-
cident" is not work-related, when the real reason would be a feeling
that the employee is somehow "at fault" for being susceptible to
such falls in the first place.
Employee "fault" of the non-intentional variety has no place in
the Act. Louisiana has long been committed to the proposition that
when the predisposition of an employee combines with a work acci-
dent to produce disability that would not have occurred in the case
of a healthy employee, he is nonetheless entitled to benefits based
upon that disability." It is consistent that the court should also hold
that when the predisposition of an employee helps to cause the work
accident, the resulting disability is compensable. The employer does
42. W. MALONE AND A. JOHNSON, supra note 3, § 191 at 382-419. When the
worker finds himself only marginally in the course of his employment, a different
result might be appropriate. If the worker in question is provided car fare home as a
part of her wages, and suffers her fall as she alights from the bus in front of her
house, it might be unfair to assign responsibility for this risk to the employer.
43. 199 La. 720, 6 So. 2d 747 (1942).
44. See, e.g., Roberson v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 316 So. 2d 22 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1975); W. MALONE AND A. JOHNSON, supra note 3, at § 232.
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take the worker as he finds him, whether the worker's condition
tends to produce accidents or tends to make the results of accidents
more severe when they actually occur.
RIGHTS AGAINST THIRD PERSONS
Two cases decided by the supreme court during this term dealt
with the rights of the employer and the employee against a third
party tortfeasor. In Allstate Insurance Company v. Theriot,'5 a
worker (Moore) was returning from medical treatment for a work-
related injury. He was injured in an automobile accident, allegedly
through the negligence of the defendant (Theriot). The compensation
carrier filed suit against Theriot within a year of the accident, alleg-
ing that it had been required to pay additional compensation
benefits because of aggravation of the work-related injury through
Theriot's negligence. More than two years after the accident, Moore
intervened in the suit, seeking tort damages against Theriot.
The trial court sustained a peremptory exception of no right or
no cause of action to Allstate's petition, and one of prescription as to
the intervention. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of All-
state's petition and held that Moore's intervention also should be
dismissed because the -principal demand had been dismissed for fail-
ure to state a cause of action.' Thus the appellate court did not
reach the prescription question with reference to the intervention.
The supreme court, by a narrow margin, denied a writ with refer-
ence to the principal demand,'7 but granted a writ to review the
45. 376 So. 2d 950 (La. 1979).
46. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Theriot, 362 So. 2d 1214 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
47. There were three dissents to the writ denial as to Allstate. Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Theriot, 366 So. 2d at 559 (La. 1979) (Tate, Calogero, and Dennis, JJ., dissenting).
Though the court of appeal had not reached the prescription question due to its
disposition of the case, the supreme court granted certiorari to review that question as
well. See LA. CONST. art. V, § 5(F).
The fact that the supreme court denied a writ on the issue of whether Allstate's
petition stated a cause of action may be taken as weak approval of the proposition that
an employer or insurer might not be liable in compensation for any aggravation of a
work-related injury by the independent negligence of a third person, even though that
negligence might have occurred in the course of medical treatment of the original in-
jury. The fact that the court denied a writ to review the decision that such additional
benefits may be recovered from the third person suggests either that (a) the court
believes that such benefits for the aggravation should not be recoverable from the
employer or insurer in the first place; or (b) if recoverable, they should remain with
the employer or insurer and not be shifted to the tortfeasor; or (c) the case was not an
appropriate one in which to deal with the issue.
The question of benefits for aggravation of a work-related injury by the negligence
of a third person has divided other jurisdictions. Compare Immer & Co. v. Brosnahan,
207 Va. 720, 152 S.E.2d 254 (1967) (compensation awarded for injuries suffered in
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dismissal and prescription questions with reference to the interven-
tion .
The supreme court first held that the intervention did not fall with
dismissal of the main demand, a ruling not here pertinent. Then it
approved its earlier position in National Surety Corp. v. Standard
Accident Insurance Company 9 that a timely suit by a compensation
carrier for reimbursement of compensation paid to an injured em-
ployee interrupts prescription running against the employee's own
tort action.
This seems to be a correct result, though the issue is a close
one. The court in the instant case repeats the language of National
Surety that "there is only one principal cause of action" when a tort-
feasor injures an employee. Later the court refers to the rights of
the employer or insurer and those of the employee as being the
same cause of action, but places the word "same" in quotation
marks. Both of these references suggest some confusion as to the
number of "causes of action" which might have been created by the
tortfeasor's conduct. Indubitably the court discusses the issue with
the thought that its resolution holds the key to solving the problem
of prescription. Perhaps this reliance is misplaced.
Insofar as the question of single versus multiple causes of action
is concerned, plausible authority exists to support both sides of the
issue. When the compensation act was first passed, the rights of the
employer were based on the principle of subrogation.' It probably
would have been appropriate then to refer to a single cause of action,
a portion of it having been granted to the employer by subrogation
upon payment of the compensation benefits due. Shortly thereafter,
the reference to subrogation was deleted. 1 The injured employee
and the employer are now each entitled to proceed against a third
person in whom there has been created "a legal liability to pay dam-
ages . . . ." With reference to the employee, the language may be
automobile accident while going to doctor's office) with Kiger v. Idaho Corporation, 85
Idaho 424, 380 P.2d 208 (1963). See generally W. MALONE AND A. JOHNSON, supra note
3, at § 236.
48. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Theriot, 366 So. 2d 559 (La. 1979).
49. 247 La. 905, 175 So. 2d 263 (1965).
50. 1914 La. Acts, No. 20 section 7 provided that the employer having paid com-
pensation, or having become obligated to do so "shall be subrogated to the rights of
the injured employee" to recover against third persons.
51. Act 247 of 1920 amended that portion of the statute referring to the
employer's rights against third persons so that it read almost identically to its present
reading (codified as LA. R.S. 23:1101 (1950 & Supp. 1976)), which is: "Any person hav-
ing paid or having become obligated to pay compensation under the provisions of this
Chapter may bring suit against such third person to recover any amount which he has
paid or become obligated to pay as compensation to such employee or his dependents."
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superfluous. He already had that right prior to the compensation
Act, and unless the Act took that right away from him, he should be
entitled to assert it. As for the employer, the Act is the source of a
new right, as it was the source of a new responsibility. The
employer's damage for which he seeks reimbursement is not caused
solely by the conduct of the tortfeasor. It is caused by the conduct
of the tortfeasor and the requirement of the compensation Act that
under certain circumstances he pay designated benefits to the in-
jured worker. In fact, were it not for the compensation Act, the
employer probably would have no cause of action against the tort-
feasor at all.
If one focuses primarily on the conduct of the tortfeasor and
reasons that a single act on his part has caused two different types
of damage, or damage to different individuals, one might argue that
there is but one cause of action. If one focuses primarily on the
source of the rights of the two plaintiffs, the argument might be ad-
vanced that the employee's action arises purely out of tort law, and
the employer's action out of a combination of tort and compensation
law. This suggests support for a multiple cause of action theory.2
But the real purpose of prescription statutes is not to resolve
fine questions concerning causes of action. Rather, such statutes ex-
ist to encourage prompt resolution of disputes by giving adequate
notice to the proposed defendant and by avoiding undue prejudice in
his defense of the claim made against him. This policy was recog-
nized by the court in the Theriot decision." When either the
employer or the employee timely sues on the basis of an injury
which was covered by the compensation Act, the defendant should
be aware that the law provides a remedy for the other. Not only are
the two possible plaintiffs related by a contract of employment, but
their potential award will be based upon a division of what the pro-
per tort damages would be if the compensation Act never existed."
52. There is also support for this theory in other parts of the statute. If there is
only a single cause of action, why would the statute provide that the employer or
employee "may" intervene in the other's litigation? See LA. R.S. 23:1102 (1950). Why
should we not require intervention, since otherwise this "single" cause of action might
be subjected to differing judicial resolutions?
53. "The fundamental purpose of prescription statutes is only to afford a defen-
dant security of mind and affairs if no claim is made timely, and to protect him from
stale claims and from the loss or non-preservation of relevant proof .... Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Theriot, 376 So. 2d 950, 954 (La. 1979).
54. The theory of the Act is that any damages recoverable from the tortfeasor
would be subjected first to the claim of the employer or insurer for reimbursement.
The remainder would be available to the injured employee. Thus, the tortfeasor pays
normal tort damages despite the existence of the Act; the employer takes a portion for
reimbursement; and the employee receives normal tort damages, partially in compen-
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Their claims can thus be distinguished from the legitimate hypo-
thetical problems worrying the dissenters."
If the rule with reference to interruption of prescription is seen
primarily in terms of adequate notice and no undue prejudice, then
abuses can readily be corrected. If the employer or insurer timely
sues and the employee intervenes five years later (or initiates a
separate suit after the first is completed), the defendant may in ap-
propriate circumstances urge that he will be prejudiced in his de-
fense of the case. If he can show prejudice, and if the late party can
show no reasonable excuse for the delay, then the claim should be
dismissed.
The discussion about one cause of action or multiple causes of
action also played a role in the decision in Roche v. Big Moose Oil
Field Truck Service." Both the employer and the employee's benefi-
ciaries timely filed suits arising out of conduct chargeable to the
defendant. The employer sought reimbursement for death benefits
paid under the Act; the employee's family sought wrongful death
damages. The employer's suit was filed one day before the family's
suit. The appellate court has ruled that since the employer's suit
was pending at the time the family's suit was filed, the latter suit
would have to be dismissed and the family should intervene in the
employer's suit. 7 The supreme court reversed, holding squarely for
the first time that the employee or his family is not required to in-
tervene in the employer's pending action.
The court conceded that its ruling was inconsistent with the
treatment accorded to an employer's suit when the employee's suit
is pending. In Todd-Johnson Dry Docks, Inc. v. City of New
sation benefits and partially in the remainder (if any) after the employer has been
reimbursed.
55. Citing the brief of defendants, one of the dissenting justices wondered about
the disposition of the claims of fifty bus passengers injured through the negligence of
the bus driver. If only one passenger sues timely, would prescription be interrupted so
long as that one suit is pending? That hypothetical situation can properly be
distinguished from the one present in Theriot. Notice that there were injuries to one
bus passenger and what the extent of those injuries might be is not notice that there
are necessarily injuries to others, or what the extent of those injuries might be. The
passengers are not previously related by contract, and their contract is not subject to
a special statute such as the Compensation Act which assigns certain responsibilities
and rights to them because of the contract. When the tortfeasor injures an individual
and is sued by either the employer or the employee alleging the contract of employ-
ment and coverage of the Act, he knows that the Compensation Act gives or protects
certain rights in the other party to that contract.
56. 381 So. 2d 396 (La. 1980).
57. Roche v. Big Moose Oil Field Truck Serv., 371 So. 2d 1374 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1979).
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Orleans,58 it was held by an appellate court in 1951 that an employer
which failed to intervene in the pending suit of its employee could
not later bring an independent tort action for reimbursement. This
ruling was almost certainly based upon the notion that the action of
the employer and the employee were the same; the court com-
mented that the employer's rights were based upon subrogation to a
part of the employee's action. 9 This was a particularly curious rul-
ing, since the Act then stated (and now states) only that either claim-
ant is required to notify the other of the suit and that the other
"may intervene." 0
It is correct for the supreme court to conclude in the light of
that statutory language that the employee cannot be compelled to
intervene. The statute is clearly permissive, not mandatory."1 In
fact, unless the statute is amended, the earlier decisions requiring
an employer to intervene should be overruled." If judicial economy
dictates that the two claims be litigated together, as appears ap-
propriate, then one of two legislative actions should be taken. Either
the Act should be amended to require intervention rather than
merely to permit it, or the Code of Civil Procedure should be amended
to provide for consolidation of cases pending in different courts."
EXCLUSIVE REMEDY: DUAL CAPACITY OF EMPLOYER
The complexity of modern business organizations makes it possi-
ble that an employer might have more than one capacity. The manu-
facturer of vacuum cleaners, for example, may employ an individual
58. 55 So. 2d 650 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1951).
59. Todd-Johnson Dry Docks, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 55 So. 2d 650, 656 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1951). The court did not observe that the specific reference to subroga-
tion in the Act had been deleted thirty years prior to its opinion. See text at notes
41-42, supra.
60. LA. R.S. 23:1102 (1950): "If either the employee or his dependent, or the
employer, brings suit against a third person .. ., he shall forthwith notify the other in
writing of such fact and of the name of the court in which the suit is filed, and such
other may intervene as party plaintiff in the suit."
61. See LA. R.S. 1:3 (1950): "The word 'shall' is mandatory and the word 'may' is
permissive."
62. Expressions to this effect may also be found in National Sur. Corp. v. Stan-
dard Accident Ins. Co., 247 La. 905, 175 So. 2d 263 (1965); Marquette Cas. Co. v.
Brown, 235 La. 245, 103 So. 2d 269 (1958).
63. The only present provision for consolidation is found in Code of Civil Pro-
cedure article 1561, which is limited to matters pending in the same court: "When two
or more separate suits involving a common issue of law or fact are pending in the
same court, the court, at any time prior to trial, may order the consolidation of the
suits for trial or may order a joint trial of any of the common issues." The court in
Roche eschewed a jurisprudential resolution of the multiple-court consolidation ques-
tion.
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to clean the executive suite at night. Of course, the manufacturer's
brand of vacuum cleaner would be used. If the employee is injured
by a defect in the vacuum cleaner or negligence in its manufacture,
may he sue the manufacturer (his employer) in tort?
Jurisdictions have divided on the resolution of such questions.
During this term, a Louisiana appellate court faced the question for
the first time, albeit in a case in which the issue was fairly easy to
decide. In Wright v. Moore,4 the plaintiff was a nurse employed by
the Louisiana Department of Health and Human Resources. While in
the course of her employment, she was injured in an automobile ac-
cident. The state of Louisiana, through the Department of Transpor-
tation and Development, was among the defendants named in her
tort suit, on the ground that a malfunctioning traffic signal under
the supervision of that department was in part responsible for the
collision. After answering, the state moved for summary judgment
on the basis that the plaintiff's exclusive remedy was in compensa-
tion since she was an employee of the state through another divi-
sion. The motion was granted by the trial court, and that ruling was
affirmed by the appellate court.
The court recognized that if an employer had more than one
capacity, it might be appropriate to assign responsibility in tort in
the capacity which was separate from that of the employer/employee
relationship. But the court reasoned that the state had only a single
capacity: providing essential state services. Although separate func-
tions were involved in the two departments (health service and traf-
fic control), they were related in the discharge of the state's govern-
mental mission."
This result seems correct. The concept of the compensation
statutes is to provide a prompt but limited recovery to an injured
worker from his employer, leaving the worker free to seek more ex-
tensive damages from a "third party" tortfeasor. The amount of
compensation paid by the employer is theoretically to be borne by
those who purchase the product he makes or the service he pro-
vides. If the business of the employer is clearly divided into two
unrelated capacities, one in which the worker is employed and the
other one in which he happens to be injured, it would be appropriate
to cast the loss ultimately on the unrelated capacity. To the extent
64. 380 So. 2d 172 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979). Accord: McGuire v. Honeycutt, 387 So.
2d 674 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980) (employee of Department of Corrections cannot sue the
state through Military Department in tort for negligence of employee of the latter).
65. The court also cited the discussion in 2 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION, § 72.80 (1976), which is a thorough analysis of the dual-capacity concept
and the decisions dealing with it in the various jurisdictions.
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that the consumers in one capacity can be wholly distinguished from
those in the other, it is proper to assign the loss so that it can be
spread among those who purchase the product "causing" the injury.
Of course, if the capacities cannot easily be separated, no par-
ticular advantage exists in attempting to divide them. In Wright, only
one service was being provided, and only one group was paying for
it. Any tort damages awarded to the plaintiff would ultimately have
been paid for by the group of persons who pay taxes to the state."
Other situations are more difficult to resolve. Suppose an in-
dividual operates a drugstore and, a few doors down the block, a
laundromat. If a drugstore employee is delivering an item and is in-
jured by a swinging door as he passes the laundromat, may he sue
his employer in tort in his "capacity" as laundromat owner? It could
be argued that the consumers of laundromat services should prop-
erly bear that loss and can be distinguished from the consumers of
drugstore services."
Or suppose the manufacturer mentioned earlier in this section
manufactures lawnmowers, but has made a few vacuum cleaners for
use around the plant. If these vacuum cleaners are not made for sale
to the public, then it is plausible to argue that no tort suit against
the employer should be permitted if a cleaning employee is injured.
The manufacturer does not have a separate "capacity" as manufac-
turer of vacuum cleaners, and no group exists other than lawn-
mower purchasers to bear such a loss.
This should point us toward a conclusion regarding the
hypothetical situation which opens this section. If an employee is in-
jured while using a product also made available to the public, then it
might be argued that he should not be deprived of his remedy as a
member of the public simply because he happens to be employed in
an entirely separate capacity. But in the example presented, it ap-
pears that the same group of persons will pay for his tort damage as
66. Thus it might be argued that if in Wright, the municipal government was
responsible for the traffic signal which led to the injury of a state employee, a dif-
ferent result should follow. The group of persons who pay municipal taxes would be
asked to bear this loss instead of the persons who pay state taxes. But even this
distinction might prove too fine to be acceptable.
67. This seems to be a case in which it would be proper to permit the tort suit.
However, in Hudson v. Allen, 11 Mich. App. 511, 161 N.W.2d 596 (1968), the court held
that the employer was immune in tort in just this factual situation. It was probably im-
portant that though the businesses were separate in appearance to the public, they
were wholly owned by the same individual, who kept all the records in common and
paid taxes incurred in the operation of either business under the name of the
drugstore. It might be argued, then, that the laundromat was not a separate capacity,
but only another portion of the business premises separated by a short distance.
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would pay for his compensation loss: those who purchase vacuum
cleaners. This would suggest that compensation should be
exclusive.6"
The court in Wright appears to have taken a sensible view in
applying the dual-capacity test. Louisiana courts should approach
such suits with care and, before permitting an employer to be cast
in tort, should attempt to identify clearly the two "capacities" of the
employer and to distinguish the two groups of persons whom he serves.
If it appears that the same group which would bear the compensation
loss will also bear the tort loss, then probably the employer does not ac-
tually have two "capacities" and should not be case in tort.
CONFLICT OF LAWS
The claimant in Jerry v. Young's Well Service" was injured in
Louisiana during the course of his employment for an Arkansas cor-
poration. He brought suit in Louisiana, seeking benefits under the
Louisiana Act. The compensation carrier for the employer brought a
third-party demand against another Arkansas corporation and its in-
surer, alleging that the claimant had been injured in Arkansas two
weeks prior to the Louisiana injury while the claimant was in the
68. California reached an opposite conclusion in a similar case. In Douglas v. E. &
J. Gallo Winery, 69 Cal. App. 3d 103, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1977), it was held that
employees of a scaffolding manufacturer stated a cause of action in tort for damages
suffered when the scaffolding on which they were working collapsed. The Douglas
court cited an earlier California decision with a similar result, Duprey v. Shane, 39 Cal.
2d 781, 249 P.2d 8 (1952). The claimant was an employee of a chiropractic clinic and
was injured during her employment. The defendant chiropractor, also an employee of
the clinic, undertook to treat her and allegedly did so in a negligent fashion. The claim-
ant's tort suit against the clinic under these circumstances was held to state a cause of
action, and the award in her favor was affirmed. The Douglas court distinguished two
cases not permitting a tort suit against the employer in instances in which it was not
shown that the injuring object was for sale to the public. Shook v. Jacuzzi, 59 Cal.
App. 3d 978, 129 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1976); Williams v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 50 Cal. App.
3d 116, 123 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1975).
See generally Comment, Workmen's Compensation and Employer Suability: The
Dual-Capacity Doctrine, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 818 (1974) (suggesting that the California ap-
proach in Duprey has the laudatory result of deterring future similar conduct by the
tortfeasor). So long as there is genuine "wrongdoing" involved, this may be accurate.
But when liability is assigned to the employer only because of a "defect" in the prod-
uct not traceable to "wrongdoing," this argument loses some of its strength. The mat-
ter then becomes similar to the issue faced by the Illinios court in Eager v. Nathan, 14
Ill. App. 2d 418, 144 N.E.2d 629 (1957), in which the court refused to permit an
employer to shift his compensation loss to a tavern owner under the "no-fault" Dram
Shop Act when a clerk in the employer's hotel was shot by persons to whom the defend-
ant had sold liquor.
69., 375 So. 2d 186 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
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employ of that corporation and that the combination of the two in-
juries resulted in the disability. The third party demand sought con-
tribution from the Arkansas corporation. The parties stipulated that
the claimant's original employer (Arkansas injury) was not licensed
to do business in Louisiana, had no agent for service of process here,
and had done work in Louisiana only on one occasion. The parties
also stipulated that the claimant was not a Louisiana domiciliary at
the time he worked for either employer, and that the claimant never
worked in Louisiana for the original employer.
On these facts, the trial court sustained exceptions to the third-
party demand on the ground that it lacked personal jurisdiction over
the original employer, and on the ground that there was no right of
direct action against the compensation carrier of the original em-
ployer. Exceptions based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction were
overruled.
The court of appeal reversed in part, sustaining the exceptions
based upon subject matter jurisdiction and overruling those based
upon lack of personal jurisdiction. The result, however, was the
same: dismissal of the third-party demand for contribution.
The appellate court correctly observed that Louisiana tradi-
tionally has not applied Louisiana law to a compensation contro-
versy when both the employment contract and the injury occurred
outside of this state."0 Even the expanded test for application of
Louisiana law found in recent amendments to the Act probably
would not require a different result, since it hardly could be argued
that the claimant's employment was "principally localized" in this
state.7
The court then turned its attention to the question of whether it
might apply some other state's law to the controversy. The court
properly recognized that in an occasional case, a Louisiana forum
could apply another state's compensation law if it could give the
claimant a complete recovery and if the administration of the other
state's law was compatible with the procedures of the Louisiana
forum. 2 The compensation statutes in Arkansas, in common with
70. See W. MALONE AND A. JOHNSON, supra note 11, at § 407.
71. See LA. R.S. 23:1035.1 (Supp. 1975), which entered the Act in 1975. It permits
the application of Louisiana law to an out-of-state injury when the contract of hire was
"made in this state" or when the worker's "employment is principally localized in this
state."
72. See, e.g., Smith v. Globe Indem. Co., 243 So. 2d 882 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971);
Babineaux v. Southeastern Drilling Corp., 170 So. 2d 518 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 247 La. 613, 172 So. 2d 700 (1965). On this basis, the court refused to apply
Mississipi law in Woodham v. Travelers Ins. Co., 161 So. 2d 368 (La. App. 3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 246 La. 88, 163 So. 2d 360 (1964), concluding that the Mississppi remedy
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most states, are admininstered primarily by an administrative com-
mission. This is an approach largely foreign to Louisiana judges and
lawyers, and the court concluded that it would be inappropriate to
apply Arkansas law in a Louisiana forum. Thus it concluded that the
court lacked "subject matter jurisdiction" over the third-party de-
mand, requiring its dismissal."
The court made short shrift of another argument of the third-
party plaintiff which probably deserved more attention. The third-
party plaintiff argued that its contribution demand was not based in
either the Louisiana Act or the Arkansas Act, but rather in the ar-
ticles of the Civil Code relative to contribution among solidary
obligors.74 Louisiana courts have recognized a right of contribution
between two employers (or their insurers) when injuries in the sep-
arate employment of each have combined to produce the final dis-
abling result in the employee." This right of contribution has no
basis in the compensation Act itself. It is equitable in nature and of
jurisprudential creation, having its only conceivable statutory basis
in the Civil Code. The appellate court rejected this argument, noting
in passing that the case cited by the third-party plaintiff in support
of the proposition concerned injuries which were both compensable
under the Louisiana Act."6
The court was more distrustful of its adjudicatory powers than
it should have been. On two different grounds, it might have decided
that it had authority to resolve the third-party demand. In the first
place, it easily could have accepted the claim of the third-party
plaintiff that only Louisiana law was at issue on the actual contribu-
tion claim between the employers or their insurers. Though Arkan-
sas law would have to be applied to determine the extent of the obli-
gation of the original employer to the claimant, Louisiana law govern-
ing solidary obligors would govern their relationship to each other.
was so intertwined with the Mississippi procedure that a Louisiana court could not
fairly resolve the case.
73. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2: "Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the legal
power and authority of a court to hear and determine a particular class of actions or
proceedings, based upon the object of the demand, the amount in dispute, or the value
of the right asserted." The issue in Jerry was not so much the authority of the court
to determine the case, but rather its reluctance to apply the law of another state to do
SO.
74. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2103.
75. See White v. Taylor, 5 So. 2d 337 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1941); Brock v. Jones &
Laughlin Supply Co., 39 So. 2d 904 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1949). Cf. Fontenot v. Great Am.
Indem. Co., 127 So. 2d 822 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961); Finley v. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co.,
237 La. 214, 110 So. 2d 583 (1959).
76. Lum v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 252 So. 2d 157 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971) (a case in
which an actual contribution demand was at issue).
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In the second place, the court could have recognized that reluctance
to apply another state's law in a Louisiana forum (especially one ad-
ministered by a commission) is primarily for the protection of the
worker himself. If Arkansas has a complete scheme for protection of
the worker, probably including rehabilitation and continuing super-
vision not available in Louisiana, then it might be unwise for Loui-
siana to attempt to apply that scheme in a local forum. But the issue
before the court in Jerry was not protection of the worker; it was
allocation of loss between employers after protection of the
worker."
The policy which would lead a Louisiana court to reject a
piecemeal application of another state's law in order to avoid unfair
treatment of a worker need not guide the court's decision on alloca-
tion of costs between employers. The court therefore could have ap-
plied only Arkansas substantive law to the third-party demand, both
as to the extent of the obligation issue and as to the contribution
issue.
In either event, the court could have permitted the third-party
plaintiff to litigate the contribution issue in the Louisiana forum to
which it was brought by the claimant. And this could have occurred
without prejudice to any rights of the claimant, or partial borrowing
of another state's law. 8
77. It may have been significant that the contribution demand was between two
Arkansas employers, made to litigate in Louisiana only because the claimant's injury
occurred here and he preferred Louisiana benefits. Perhaps the court would have been
more inclined to permit litigation of the contribution suit here if the third-party plain-
tiff had been a Louisiana employer. In that instance, Louisiana has a stronger argu-
ment both to hear the case and to apply Louisiana law to the third-party demand for
contribution.
78. As it turned out, the claimant pursued his claim in an Arkansas suit but lost
on the merits. Thus the third-party demand became moot in any forum.
1981]
